Economics

Paid by the people who buy the signal

Not by routing your order to whoever pays most for it. Four revenue lines, one of which does most of the work, and half of net signal revenue goes back to the forecasters whose priors were consumed.

01 / Revenue

Four lines, no payment for order flow

Routing and realised price improvement get published monthly, per venue. That is the whole difference: the same user, the same trade, a different payer.

LineWho paysBasisShare at scale
Signal licensing Funds, corporates, model developers Subscription plus per query 55%
Execution The user, disclosed $0.35 per equity order, $0.50 per options contract 20%
Agent marketplace Agent authors 15% of attributable subscription revenue 15%
Net interest Idle cash spread Disclosed, never swept without consent 10%
50%
of net signal revenue to forecasters
Paid monthly in USDC, attributable to the priors actually consumed.
$0
cost to enter and earn
No token purchase, no stake, no NFT. This is the anti-ponzi test.
$0
payment for order flow
Forgoing roughly 4.5× the equities rate on options is the cost of the model.

02 / Unit economics

$159 per user per year, and it turns on one variable

Modelled on an engaged discretionary trader committing 12 priors and placing 18 orders a month. Comparable to Robinhood's blended figure, earned from signal buyers and disclosed fees instead of from the user's own uninformed flow.

Labelled honestly

These are modelled figures on a target cohort, not measured results. There are no users. Every protocol figure elsewhere on this site comes out of the engine; this page is the one that carries a business model, and it is marked as such.

modelled, per user per month
signal share      $9.10   the swing variable
execution         $2.35
agent marketplace $1.10
net interest      $0.70
─────────────────────────────
net revenue       $13.25 / mo
                  $159 / yr
Signal ARPUAnnualVerdict
$2 / mo$116Marginal
$5 / mo$134Viable
$9.10 / mo$159Base case
$18 / mo$212Strong
Everything turns on signal ARPU. Execution, marketplace and interest are close to fixed, which is why the institutional side is the only side worth optimising.

03 / Scale and demand

The budget already exists. It is being spent on worse data.

Prior Protocol does not need a new category to be created. It needs a small share of a large, growing, already-committed budget line.

$49.2B
global financial market data spend, 2025
Up 6.5% on the year, a record. Burton-Taylor, TP ICAP.
~$10B
hedge fund alternative data spend, 2026
Hedge funds are about 68% of the alternative data market by revenue.
94%
of surveyed firms raising alt-data budgets in 2026
Survey across US, UK, Hong Kong and Singapore, firms running about $2.4tn.
$40M to $60M
alt-data spend, each, top 20 funds
Per firm, per year. 84% of all firms spend $500k to $2.5m.

What the base case actually asks for

The $159 per user figure at 400,000 forecasters requires roughly $43M of annual signal revenue, which is about 200 to 400 institutional subscriptions.

Set against the numbers above, $43M is under 0.1% of global market data spend and under half a percent of hedge fund alternative data spend. It is less than one top-20 fund spends on alternative data by itself.

the ask, in context
base case signal revenue   $43M / yr

as a share of
  market data spend  0.087%
  hedge fund alt data 0.43%
  one top-20 fund's
  alt-data budget     under 1×

─────────────────────────────────

This is not a claim that the money
is easy to win. Funds are slow and
suspicious of retail-sourced data.
It is a claim that the budget line
exists and is growing, so the risk
is sales, not category creation.

Why the timing is now and not three years ago

Burton-Taylor attributes the record spend to a shift away from static reporting toward real-time analytics, alternative data and AI-driven intelligence. Buyers are already paying for model output. What they cannot currently buy anywhere is a verified track record attached to it. Every provider selling them a forecast today is selling an unfalsifiable claim about its own accuracy.

04 / $PRIOR

Revenue buys the token back and burns it

There are no emissions. Nothing is printed to pay yield. The only source of value flowing to holders is fee revenue the protocol actually collected.

  • A fixed share of net protocol fee revenue buys $PRIOR on the open market and burns it, on a published schedule with every transaction verifiable on chain.
  • Slashed bonds are burned rather than redistributed, so punishing a bad adapter or resolver does not enrich anyone in particular.
  • Fixed supply, mint authority revoked at genesis. Supply can fall and cannot rise.
  • Staking rewards come from fee revenue only. If revenue is zero, rewards are zero, and the protocol keeps working.
what the token is not
not required to open an account
not required to commit a prior
not required to receive revenue share
not required to pay fees
not how you own a record
    records are soulbound

─────────────────────────────────

is forecaster bonding against
   your own calibration, slashable
is adapter and resolver bonds
is buyer-side staking for
   query priority
AllocationShareTerms
Forecaster rewards34%10 year decaying
Community and genesis22%
Contributors18%4 yr vest, 1 yr cliff, identical for founders
Treasury14%Multisig, 48h timelock
Investors8%3 yr vest, no discount to the public round
Liquidity4%Locked 24 months

The part most projects leave out

A buyback funded by protocol revenue strengthens the argument that $PRIOR is a security, because it ties holder returns directly to the efforts of the team. Applying Howey without flinching gives investment of money, common enterprise, expectation of profit, substantially from the efforts of others. $PRIOR is likely a security in the United States. Utility does not defeat Howey, and calling a buyback a burn does not either. Where no compliant structure exists in a jurisdiction, the protocol ships there without the token.

05 / The test applied to ourselves

It has to survive its own token going to zero

Three comparables, sorted by who actually pays. The pattern is not subtle, and the moment earning requires buying, early users are structurally paid by late ones.

ProjectLatent assetWho paysCapital to enterOutcome
STEPNwalkingthe next buyer~$500 NFTWent to zero
friend.techsocial graphthe next buyerkey priceWent to zero
Grassidle bandwidthAI companies$0Alive
Grass: over 2M users, 3PB a day, roughly 20 paying customers. External buyers rather than the next entrant.

Zero capital entry

Passes

Yield from external buyers

Passes

Payouts in USDC

Passes

Survives token at zero

Passes

Sequencing

The token is deliberately last, at Phase 4, after the protocol, the scoring and dollar revenue all work. A design that cannot survive its own token going to zero was never a business, and the fastest way to find out is to build the business before the token rather than after it.

06 / What would break this

The corpus is real and nobody buys it

Rated medium to high on the risk register. Funds move slowly and are suspicious of anything sourced from retail. A large, growing budget line is necessary but not sufficient, and the mitigation is to sign design partners before the corpus exists, with the claim taxonomy built to their specification rather than ours.

Calibration may not convert into returns

Returns depend on sizing, timing, costs and tails, not only on directional accuracy. Calibration is necessary and not sufficient. The signal is therefore positioned as an input to a buyer's process rather than as a recommendation, and the composer carries Kelly sizing for the same reason.